Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

1986

H.C. Heninger and Doris W. Heninger v. Ninth
Circuit Court, State of Utah, Washington County,
St. George Department, and Robert F. Owens,
Circuit Judge : Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Gary W. Pendleton; Attorney for Plaintiff.
David L. Wilkinson; Attorney General; Diane W. Wilkins; Assistant Attorney General; Attorneys for
Defendants.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Heninger and Heninger v. Ninth Circuit Court, No. 198620976.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1986).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/1476

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

H. C. HENINGER and DORIS W.
HENINGER,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,
vs.
NINTH CIRCUIT COURT, S t a t e of
Utah, Washington County,
S t . George Department, and
ROBERT F. OWENS, C i r c u i t J u d g e ,

Case No. 20976
Category N o . 13b

Defendant s - A p p e l l a n t s .

BRIEF QF APPELLANT

UTAH SUPREME CO1
BEIIEF
DOCUWENT
KFU
DOCKET N O . , / ^ H fr

DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General
DIANE W. WILKINS
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Attorneys for Defendants

GARY W. PENDLETON
50 East 100 South, Suite 101
St. George, Utah 84770
Attorney for Plaintiff

FILED
APR 2 Z 1986
Clerk, Supr«r» Court, Utah

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

H. C. HENINGER and DORIS W.
HENINGER,

Plaintiffs-Respondents,
vs,
NINTH CIRCUIT COURT, State of
Utah, Washington Countyf
St. George Department/ and
ROBERT F. OWENSf Circuit Judge,

Case No. 20976
Category No. 13b

Defendants-Appellants.

BRIEF QF APPELLANT

DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General
DIANE W. WILKINS
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Attorneys for Defendants

GARY W. PENDLETON
50 East 100 South, Suite 101
St. George, Utah 84770
Attorney for Plaintiff

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

i

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

V

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

1

STATEMENT OF FACTS

1

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

4

ARGUMENT
POINT I

BONDSMEN'S APPROPRIATE REMEDY WAS TO
APPEAL THE NINTH CIRCUIT COURT'S FORFEITURE
RULING DIRECTLY TO THE DISTRICT COURT AND
THEIR FAILURE TO RAISE THAT APPEAL CONSTITUTES A WAIVER

5

THE DISTRICT COURT ACTED IMPROPERLY AND
WITHOUT AUTHORITY IN GRANTING BONDSMEN'S
PETITION FOR AN EXTRAORDINARY WRIT

7

POINT I I I THE DISTRICT COURT LACKED CONSTITUTIONAL
AUTHORITY WHEN IT EXERCISED SUPERVISORY
AUTHORITY OVER THE NINTH CIRCUIT COURT

9

POINT I I

POINT IV

POINT V

JUDGE OWENS HAS AUTHORITY AND DISCRETION
TO SUPERVISE BONDSMEN IN THE NINTH CIRCUIT
COURT AND THE REVOCATION OF BONDSMEN'S
BONDING PRIVILEGES WAS PROPER

13

THE DISTRICT COURT IMPROPERLY INTERPRETED
UTAH CODE ANN. § 7 7 - 2 0 - 7 AND 7 7 - 2 0 - 8
WITH RESPECT TO THE EFFECTIVE TERM OF
THE UNDERTAKING OF BAIL AND THE LIABILITY
OF BONDSMEN

23

CONCLUSION

25

APPENDIX

27

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Allen v. Lindbeck. 97 Utah 471, 93 P.2d 920 (1939)

8

Anderson v. BakerP 5 Utah 2d 33, 296 P.2d 283 (1956)...

7,8

Angeii y. Sixth Judicial
(Utah 1982)

District Qt.,

656 p.2d 405
8

-i-

Barber v. Calder. 522 P.2d 700 (Utah 1974)

17

Chesney v. District Court of Salt Lake County. 108 P.2d
514 (Utah 1941)

7

Commercial Security Bank v. Phillips. 655 P.2d 67 8
(Utah 1982)

7

Concord Casualty & Surety Co. v. United States^ 69
F.2d 78 (2nd Cir. 1934)

16

Day v. Walton. 199 Tenn. 10, 281 S.W.2d 685 (1955)

25

Gibson v. State. 655 P.2d 1028 (Okla. 1982)

24

Gilbreath v. Ferguson, 260 s.w.2d 276 (T^nn. 1953)

17

Hendrick v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co.. 154
Kan. 79, 114 P.2d 812 (1941)

25

In Re Carter. 192 F.2d 15 (D.C.Cir. 1951)

18,19,20,21

Jelm v. Jelm. 155 Ohio 226, 98 NE2d 401 (1951)

11

Kriebel v. United States. 10 F.2d 762 (7th Cir. 1926)..

24

Lee v. Provo Civil Service Comm.. 582 P.2d 485 (Utah
197 8)

8

Massey v. United States, 291 u.s. 608 (1934)

n

Monaghan v. Lewis. 5 Penn. 218, 59 A. 948 (Delaware
1905)

11

National Prohibition Cases, 253 u.s. 350 (1920)

11

National Tunnel & Mines Co. v. Industrial Comm.,
99 Utah 39, 102 P.2d 508 (1940)
Olsen v. District Court. Second Judicial District.

13

106 Utah 220, 147 P.2d 471 (1944)

7,8

People v. Tremayne. 3 Utah 331, 3 P. 85 (1884)

5,6

People v. Wilcox. 53 Cal.2d 651, 2 Cal. Rptr. 754, 349
P.2d 522 (1960)
Robinson v. City Court of Oqden. 112 Utah 36, 185 P.2d
256 (1947)
Robinson v. Purand, 36 Utah 93, 104 p. 760 (1908)
S.L.C. v. Christensen Co.. 34 Utah 38, 95 P. 523
(1939)
-ii-

6
7
12
12

Smaldon v. United States. 211 F.2d 161 (10th Cir.
1954)

6

State v. Cotton. 172 La. 295, 110 So. 480 (1926)

6

State v. O'Day. 36 Wash.2d 146, 216 P.2d 732 (1950)....

6

State v. Wright. 51 Wash.2d 606, 320 P.2d 646 (1958)...

6

Summit Fidelity & Surety Co. v. Nimitz, 158 Neb. 762,
64 N.W.2d 803 (1954)
T a y l o r v . Waddy. 334 S.W.2d 733 (Tenn. 1960)

16
15,21

U n i t e d S t a t e s v . Cardina C a s u a l t y I n s . C o . . 237 F.2d
451 ( 7 t h C i r . 1956)

6

United States v. Chambers. 291 U.S. 217 (1934)

11,12

United States v. Constantine. 296 U.S. 287 (1935)

12

United States v. Mack. 295 U.S. 480 (1935)

11

Verterans' Welfare Bd. v. Riley. 189 Cal. 159, 208
P. 678 (1922)

11

Wadsworth v . S a n t a q u i n C i t y .
(1933)

13

83 Utah 3 2 1 , 28 P.2d 161

Walton v . C i r c u i t C o u r t . Case No. 16281 (Utah 1 9 7 9 ) . . . .

6,24

Weaver v . D o s t e r t . 300 S . E . 2 d 102 (W.Va. 1983)

18,19

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

Constitution of Utah, Article VIII, § 4 (1985)

13

Constitution of Utah, Article VIII, § 5 (effective
July 1, 1985)

5,7,9,11,
12,13

Constitution of Utah, Article VIII, § 7 (1953)

9,10

Constitution of Utah, Article VIII, § 12 (1985)

13

STATUTES CITED
Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-1-11 to 58-1-20 (1953, as
amended)

18

Utah Code Ann. § 77-20-4 (1980)

14,16,17

Utah Code Ann. § 77-20-5 (1980)

14,16,19

-iii-

Utah Code Ann. § 7 7 - 2 0 - 7

(1980)

v,4f17,18
23,24

Utah Code Ann. § 7 7 - 2 0 - 8 (1980)

23

Utah Code Ann. S 7 7 - 2 0 a - l e t . s e q . (1983)

5

Utah Code Ann. § 7 8 - 3 - 4 (1983)

5,10,llfl2

Utah Code Ann. § 7 8 - 3 - 5 (1983)

5

Utah Code Ann. § 7 8 - 4 - 1 (1983)

13

Utah Code Ann. § 7 8-4-2 (1983)

13

Utah Code Ann. § 7 8 - 4 - 1 8 (1983)

13

RULES CITED
Rule 65B, Utah Rules of C i v i l Procedure (1985)

8

OTHER AUTHORITIES
Senate Joint Resolution No. l r § 4, Laws 1984
(2d S.S.)

-iv-

12

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
The f o l l o w i n g i s s u e s are put before t h i s Court:
1)

Was Respondent's appropriate remedy d i r e c t appeal

t o the d i s t r i c t court from the c i r c u i t c o u r t ' s f o r f e i t u r e

ruling

and did t h e i r f a i l u r e t o r a i s e that appeal c o n s t i t u t e a waiver?
2)

Did the d i s t r i c t court act improperly and without

a u t h o r i t y by granting an extraordinary writ?
3)

Did the d i s t r i c t court lack c o n s t i t u t i o n a l

a u t h o r i t y when i t e x e r c i s e d supervisory a u t h o r i t y over the Ninth
C i r c u i t Court?
4)

Does Judge Owens have the authority and d i s c r e t i o n

t o supervise bondsmen i n the Ninth C i r c u i t Court and was the
r e v o c a t i o n of Respondent's bonding p r i v i l e g e s proper?
5)
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

H. C. HENINGER a n d DORIS W.
HENINGERf

Plaintiffs-Respondents,
vs.
NINTH CIRCUIT COURT, State of
Utah, Washington County,
St. George Department, and
ROBERT F. OWENS, Circuit Judge,

Case No. 20976
Category No. 13b

Defendants-Appellants.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Respondents are bondsmen who petitioned the Fifth
Judicial District Court, Washington County, for an extraordinary
writ asking the District Court to exercise supervisory power over
Appellants and claiming that the Ninth Circuit Court acted
without authority in forfeiting certain bonds and revoking the
bonding privileges of the bondsmen in that court.

The District

Court granted the writ and issued a summary judgment order
holding that revocation of bonding privileges is prohibited
without notice and hearing, and that imposition of sentence
exonerates the liability of bail bondsmen by operation of law.
Consequently, the Ninth Circuit Court objected to the District
Court's ruling and filed this appeal.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant Robert F. Owens (hereinafter "Judge Owens")
presides as judge in the Ninth Circuit Court, Washington County

(R. 107) . Respondents are bondsmen (hereinafter "bondsmen") who,
prior to the initiation of this action in the Fifth District
Court, Washington County, were qualified by Judge Owens to write
bonds in the Ninth Circuit Court (R. 107). In January, 1984,
Judge Owens and the bondsmen entered into an agreement whereby
the bondsmen would be authorized to file undertakings of bail in
the Ninth Circuit Court, Washington County, upon the condition
that the bonds

would continue after sentencing and throughout

probation (R. 107) • The language of the individual bonds
provides that the terms would continue through executionof
sentence (R. 61, 107) .
The bondsmen, pursuant to the agreement and
authorization by Judge Owens, filed undertakings of bail in the
Ninth Circuit Court in behalf of four criminal defendants:
Samuel Benally, Geoffrey C. Greening, Jonathon S. Marshall, and
Dennis B. Ashcroft (R. 19, 32-39).

All four cases for which

bonds were taken involve charges of driving under the influence
of alcohol (R. 20, 22, 23, 62-63).

In each case, the defendant

in the Ninth Circuit Court failed to make himself subject to the
Ninth Circuit Court's jurisdiction for the purposes of executing
sentences imposed by that court in that they failed to abide by
the terms of probation, failed to appear at the Washington County
Jail, and/or failed to pay fines assessed as part of the circuit
courtfs sentence (R. 20, 22, 63). Bond forfeiture hearings were
held in the Ninth Circuit Court on May 6, 1985, and July 9, 1985,
at which times the bondsmen requested exoneration of the
undertakings (R. 24). Exoneration was denied by the Ninth
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Circuit Court and the bonds were forfeited (R. 24) . The bondsmen
did not appeal from the forfeiture hearings.
On May 28, 1985, the bondsmen commenced an action in
the Fifth Judicial District Court, Washington County, seeking an
extraordinary writ and order requesting that the District Court
exercise supervisory authority over the Ninth Circuit Court (R.
1, 18, 27-28). The bondsmen further requested the District Court
specify the duties and obligations of the bondsmen in the Ninth
Circuit Court (R. 27-28).
In a letter to the Washington County Sheriff dated May
29, 1985, Judge Owens exercised his discretionary powers and
authority over bondsmen in his court by rescinding authorization
previously given to accept bailbonds from the bondsmen.

Judge

Owens withdrew the bondsmen's authority on the grounds that it
was clear by the bondsmen's actions that they no longer intended
to comply with the provisions of law, the specific language of
each undertaking, and the agreement with the Ninth Circuit Court
concerning the term of the bonds (R. 61, 107) .
On September 22, 1985, Judge Burns, Fifth Judicial
District Court, exercised supervisory authority over the Ninth
Circuit Court by signing a summary judgment order (R. 118-19).
This order provided (1) that revocation of the bondsmen's bonding
privileges is prohibited unless afforded prior notice and
hearing, and (2) that imposition of sentence relieves the
obligation of the bondsmen and exonerates the undertaking of bail
by operation of law (R. 118-119).

The summary judgment was

objected to by the Judge Owens in a pleading filed in the
District Court on September 24, 1985 (R. 101-105).
-3-

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

Bondsmen's appropriate remedy was to appeal the Ninth
Circuit Court's forfeiture rulings directly to the District Court
and their failure to raise that appeal constitutes a waiver.

The

Ninth Circuit Court had jurisdiction over the bondsmen and the
subject matter at the time the District Court improperly granted
an extraordinary writ.

The Ninth Circuit Court and Judge Owens

acted well within proper jurisdiction and bondsmen had an
appropriate remedy of direct appeal from the Ninth Circuit
Court's forfeiture rulings to the District Court.

Therefore, the

District Court acted without jurisdiction in granting an
extraordinary writ.
Further, the District Court lacked constitutional
authority when it exercised supervisory authority over the Ninth
Circuit Court, thereby acting without requisite jurisdiction.
Moreover, Judge Owens had authority and discretion to
supervise bondsmen in his jurisdiction.

Because of bondsmen's

failure to comply with the terms of the undertakings and the
agreement with the Ninth Circuit Court, Judge Owens properly
exercised his discretion when he revoked bondsmen's privileges to
file undertakings of bail in the Ninth Circuit Court.
inally, the District Court's ruling that an undertaking
of bail is exonerated when sentence is imposed is contradicted by
the language of Utah Code Annotatede § 77-20-7 (1953, as amended)
and of the bonds which requires liability to extend through
execution of the sentence imposed.

-4-

ARGUMENT
POINT I
BONDSMEN'S APPROPRIATE REMEDY WAS TO APPEAL
THE NINTH CIRCUIT COURT'S FORFEITURE RULINGS
DIRECTLY TO THE DISTRICT COURT AND THEIR
FAILURE TO RAISE THAT APPEAL CONSTITUTES A
WAIVER.
Appeal procedures from the circuit court to the
district court are provided for by law.

The Utah Constitution

grants the district courts appellate jurisdiction as provided by
statute.

The Utah Constitution, Article VIIIf § 5 (effective

July 1, 1985) provides:
The district court shall have original
jurisdiction in all matters except as limited
by this constitution or by statute, and power
to issue all extraordinary writs. The
district court shall have appellate
jurisdiction as provided by statute. The
jurisdiction of all other courts, both
original and appellatef shall be provided by
statute. Except for matters filed originally
with the supreme court, there shall be in all
cases an appeal of right from the court of
original jurisdiction to a court with
appellate jurisdiction over the cause.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-4, of the District Court Act (1953, as
amended), grants appellate jurisdiction from inferior courts to
the district court and § 78-3-5 provides for appeals to the
district courts from final judgments of the circuit courts.
An appeal lies from judgments from forfeited bonds
obtained pursuant to the Bail Forfeiture Procedure Act, § 77-2a1, et. seq. (1983).

There have been no reported decisions by

this Court construing the provisions of that Act.

However, an

1884 Utah case held that appeal is not available from a bail
forfeiture order.

People v. Tremayne. 3 Utah 331, 3 P. 85
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(1884).

Although Tremayne has not been expressly overruled/ the

holding is without merit in light of recent statutory revisions
and many well-reasoned cases from other jurisdictions which allow
appeals from bail forfeiture rulings.

Cases with substantially

similar provisions finding that orders dealing with the
forfeiture of bail are appealable include: People v. Wilcox, 53
Cal.2d 651, 2 Cal. Reptr. 754f 349 P.2d 522 (1960); Smaldon v.
United States, 211 F.2d 161 (10th Cir. 1954); United States v.
Cardina Casualty Ins, Co,, 236 F.2d 451 (7th Cir. 1956); State v.
£Q££j&n, (La.r 1926) 172 La. 295, 110 So.480 (1926); State v.
HtigJii, 51 Wash.2d 606f 320 P.2d 646 (1958); and State v. O'Day,
36 Wash.2d 146, 216 P.2d 732 (1950).
Moreover, this Court has entertained an appeal from a
circuit court bail forfeiture order which had been appealed to
the district court.

Walton v. Circuit Court, No. 16281 (Utah

1979) (See Appendix A ) . Appealability of a bond forfeiture order
was not an issue, but the case was successfully appealed to the
district court and the district court order was appealed to the
Utah Supreme Court.
decision.

This Court did not mention Tremayne in its

Consequently, bond forfeiture orders appear to be

appealable in Utah, notwithstanding Tremayne.
Bondsmen initiated the Petition for an Extraordinary
Writ below before all of the forfeiture provisions in the Bond
Forfeiture Procedure Act could be exhausted, therefore the
Petition was untimely at best.

The first bond forfeiture hearing

was held on May 6, 1985, the Petition for Extraordinary Writ was
initiated May 28, 1985, and the second bond forfeiture hearing
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was scheduled for July 9, 1985. The bondsmen preemptively
commenced the action below seeking relief from the Ninth Circuit
Court1s actions even before the second bond hearing was scheduled
and complained of an anticipated result prior to any action on
the remaining two undertakings.

The bondsmen have not appealed

orders from either bond forfeiture hearing.

Bondsmen should have

availed themselves of the proper judicial remedies and procedures
pursuant to the Bail Forfeiture Procedures Act and filed a timely
appeal.

A failure to do so constituted a waiver and does not

warrant relief from the District Court in the form of an
Extraordinary Writ.

Anderson Y. Baker, 5 Utah 2d 33, 296 P.2d

283 (1956).
POINT II
THE DISTRICT COURT ACTED IMPROPERLY AND
WITHOUT AUTHORITY IN GRANTING BONDSMEN'S
PETITION FOR AN EXTRAORDINARY WRIT.
Pursuant to the Constitution of Utahf Article VIII § 5
(effective July 1, 1985)f district courts have the power to issue
all extraordinary writs.

However, that power is limited to

situations in which no other remedy is available and substantial
injustice would otherwise occur.
It is a well established principle that an
extraordinary writ is not a proceeding for general review.

Commercial Security Bank v. Phillips, 655 p.2d 678 (Utah, 1982);
Anderson v> Bakerr 5 Utah 2d 33, 296 p.2d 283 (1956); Qlsen v.
District Court, 106 Utah 220, 147 P.2d 471 (1944); Robinson v.
City Court for City of Oqden, 112 Utah 36, 105 P.2d 256 (1947);
Chesney v. District Court of Salt Lake County, 108 P.2d 514
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(Utahf 1941).

Rule 65B(a)r Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

(hereinafter "URCP"), provides in pertinent partf "where no other
plain, speedy, adequate remedy exists, relief may be obtained by
appropriate action under these rules . . . ." [Emphasis added].
Pleadings seeking relief by way of extraordinary writ pursuant to
Rule 65B, URCP, must specifically designate jurisdictional excess
or abuse of discretion claimed and are subject to being dismissed
if they merely set forth conclusions.

Angell v. Sixth Judicial

District Ct.r 656 P.2d 405 (Utah, 1982); Lee v. Provo City Civil

Service Commission/ 582 p.2d 485 (Utah, 1978).
This Court has held that if the lower court is
proceeding without jurisdiction, but it appears that there is an
adequate remedy, a writ should generally not issue.
Lindbeck. 97 Utah 471f 93 P.2d 920 (1939).

Allen v.

Also if there is no

want or excess of jurisdiction and an adequate remedy exists, a
writ should never issue.

Qlsen v. District Court/ Silvia.

Furthermore, this Court has held that if there was an adequate
remedy of appeal from a lower court that has jurisdiction over
the parties and the subject matter, and the party permits it to
lapse, he does so at his peril and an extraordinary writ should
not lie.

Anderson v. Baker, 5 Utah 2d 33, 296 P.2d 283 (1956).
Applying the above principles to the instant case, if

the Ningh Circuit Court has jurisdiction over bondsmen and the
subject matter, and if appeal to the district court was an
adequate remedy, the writ was improperly issued.

Therefore,

since the Ninth Circuit Court has jurisdiction over bondsmen and
bond forfeitures, and an appeal from a bond forfeiture is
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a v a i l a b l e , then an extraordinary writ should not l i e and the
D i s t r i c t Court acted improperly and without a u t h o r i t y in granting
t h e bondsmen's extraordinary w r i t .
POINT I I I
THE DISTRICT COURT LACKED CONSTITUTIONAL
AUTHORITY WHEN IT EXERCISED SUPERVISORY
AUTHORITY OVER THE NINTH CIRCUIT COURT.
The District Court apparently issued the extraordinary
writ under what was perceived as supervisory authority over the
Ninth Circuit Court.

However, a recent amendment to the

Constitution of Utah has removed all supervisory power district
courts previously had over circuit courts.

Article VIII, § 5 of

the Constitution of Utah, effective July, 1985, states as
follows:
The district court shall have original
jurisdiction in all matters except as limited
by this constitution or by statute, and power
to issue all extraordinary writs. The
district court shall have appellate
jurisdiction as provided by statute. The
jurisdiction of all other courts, both
original and appellate, shall be provided by
statute. Except for matters filed originally
with the supreme court, there shall be in all
cases an appeal of right from the court of
original jurisdiction to a court with
appellate jurisdiction over the cause.
The prior Constitutional provision, Article VIII, § 7,
granting jurisdiction to the district court provided:
The district court shall have original
jurisdiction in all matters civil and
criminal, not excepted in this Constitution,
and not prohibited by law; appellate
jurisdiction from all inferior courts and
tribunals, and a supervisory control of the
same.. The district courts or any judge
thereof, shall have power to issue writs of
habeas corpus, mandamus, injunction, quo
warranto, certiorari, prohibition and other
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writs necessary to carry into effect their
orders, judgments and decrees, and to give

them a general control over inferior courts
and tribunal is within their respective
jurisdictions.

[Emphasis added.]

The former provision of the Constitution granted the
district court supervisory control over inferior courts.

The new

Constitutional provision conspicuously omitts the language
dealing with the district court's supervisory powers over
inferior courts, i.e. circuit courts.

When the new

constitutional provision took effect, this provision specifically
removed any prior supervisory authority the district court had
over the circuit court under the repealed provisions.
The District Court has no statutory authority to
supervise circuit courts.

Section 78-3-4 of the District Court

Act, enacted in 1943 and amended in 1983, provides:
The district court shall have original
jurisdiction in all matters civil and
criminal, not excepted in the Constitution
and not prohibited by law; appellate
jurisdiction from all inferior courts and
tribunals, and a supervisory control of the
Same.. The district courts, or any judges
thereof, shall have power to issue writs of
habeas corpus, mandamus, injunction, quo
warranto, certiorari, prohibition, and other
writs necessary to carry into effect their
orders, judgments and decrees, and to give
them a general control over inferior courts

and tribunals within their respective
jurisdictions . • . . [Emphasis added.]
This provision was enacted pursuant to the authority specified in
Article VIII, § 7 of the prior Constitutional article and grants
to the district court supervisory authority over inferior courts,
in conformity with the prior constitutional provision.

However,

with the adoption of the new Judicial article, that portion of
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§ 78-3-4 granting the district court supervisory authority over
inferior courts is inconsistent with the new Article VIII, § 5.
As a general principlef a statute existing at the
adoption of a constitution or constitutional amendment cannot be
upheld if it is opposed to the plain terms of the Constitution.
In such a case, the statute may be regarded as repealed by the
constitutional provision by implication.

United States v. Mack,

295 U.S. 480f 79 L.Ed. 1559, 55 S.Ct. 813 (1935); Massey v.
United States, 291 U.S. 608, 78 L.Ed. 1019, 54 S.Ct. 532 (1934);
United States v. Chambers, 291 U.S. 217, 78 L.Ed. 763, 54 S.Ct.

434 (1934); National Prohibition Caser 253 U.S. 350, 64 L.Ed.
946, 40 s.ct. 486 (1920); Veterans1 Welfare Board v. Riley, 189
Cal. 159, 208 P. 678 (1922); Jelm v. Jelm. 155 Ohio 226, 98 NE2d
401 (1951).
The final test in determining whether a statute is
repealed by implication by a constitutional provision is: Does
the Legislature have the present right to enact statutes
substantially like the statute in question under the new
constitutional provision?
948 (Delaware 1905).

Monaghan v. Lewis, 5 Penn. 218, 59 A

In applying the test to the instant case,

the Legislature had the right to enact a statute substantially
like § 78-3-4, except for the supervisory language.

The

Legislature does not have the right to enact a statute which
would grant to the district courts supervisory powers over
inferior courts.

Further, if the authority of the legislature to

enact a particular statute is derived solely from a particular
constitutional provision, a repeal of such provision operates as

-11-

a repeal of the statute.

United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S.

287, 80 L.Ed. 233, 56 S.Ct. 223 (1935).
Chambersf supra.

United States v.

The powers given the district court by

constitutional provision cannot be enlarged or abridged by the
legislature.

Robinson v. Purand. 36 Utah 93, 104 P. 760 (1908).

Therefore, a repeal of the constitutional provisions dealing with
the district courts supervisory authority over inferior courts
operates as a repeal of those provisions of § 78-3-4 granting
supervisory powers of the district court over inferior courts.
Section 4 of Senate Joint Resolution No. 1, Laws 1984
(2d S.S.), providing for the repeal and reinactment of Article
VIII, states in part:
Existing statutes and rules on the effective
date [July 1, 1985] of this amendment
[Article VIII], not inconsistent with it,
shall continue in force and effect until
repealed or changed by statute.
This savings clause inserted by the Legislature provides that all
statutes in force and not inconsistent with the new
constitutional provision shall continue until amended or repealed
by the Legislature.

However, by this enactment, the Legislature

recognized that inconsistent statutes cannot continue in force
and are therefore repealed by implication.

Therefore, those

provisions of § 78-3-4 granting such supervisory powers to the
district court cannot be saved and are of no effect.
In the case before the Court, the District Ccourt acted
without constitutional authority when it attempted to exercise
such supervisory powers over Appellants.

The district court is

limited to those powers granted it by the Constitution.
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S.L.C.

v, Christensen Co. . 34 Utah 38f 95 P. 523 (1939); WadSWQrth V»
Santaquln City, 83 Utah 321, 28 P.2d 161 (1933); National Tunnel

& Mines Co. v. Industrial Commission, 99 Utah 39, 102 P.2d 508
(1940).

Consequently, the district court improperly exercised

supervisory power over the circuit court.
POINT IV
JUDGE OWENS HAS AUTHORITY AND DISCRETION TO
SUPERVISE BONDSMEN IN THE NINTH CIRCUIT COURT
AND THE REVOCATION OF BONDSMEN'S BONDING
PRIVILEGES WAS PROPER.
By constitutional grant of authority in Article VIII,
§ 5, Constitution of Utah, the Legislature enacted the Circuit
Court Act of 1977, Utah Code Ann., § 78-4-1 et. seq. (1953, as
amended), and created a circuit court system.

The purposes of

the Circuit Court Act are enumerated in § 78-4-2, as follows:
The purpose of this act is to create a
statewide court of record of limited
jurisdiction to provide full-time
professional judicial service to every county
in the state on a regular basis organized and

administered in like manner to the district
courts of the state.

To this end this act

shall be liberally construed and applied*
[Emphasis added.]
The circuit courts are courts of limited jurisdiction,
but § 78-4-18 provides that circuit judges have the same powers
with respect to matters within their jurisdiction as may be
exercised by district court judges.

The circuit courts are

supervised by the Supreme Court and the Judicial Council, as are
all Utah courts.

Article VIII, §§ 4 and 12, Constitution of Utah

(effective July 1, 1985).
The Legislature has granted to circuit court judges the
jurisdiction and powers of a magistrate, including the release on
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bail of persons charged with criminal offenses.

Section 77-20-5.

Further, section 77-20-4 provides that bail may be posted in cash
or a written undertaking with or without sureties,subject to the
discretion of the magistrate.

It is in the exercising of such

discretion that a magistrate has the authority to determine from
whom and under what minimal conditions a written undertaking, or
bond, can be accepted.

In addition, minimal qualifications of

sureties on written undertakings are specified as follows in §
77-20-5:
Qualifications of sureties—Justification—Requirements of undertaking. (1)
The sureties on written undertakings shall be
real or personal property holders within the
state and shall collectively have a net worth
of at least twice the amount of the
undertaking, exclusive of property exempt
from execution.
(2) Each surety shall justify by
affidavit upon the undertaking and each may
be further examined upon oath by the
magistrate or by the prosecuting attorney in
the presence of a magistrate, in respect to
his property and net worth.
(3) The undertaking shall, in addition
to other requirements, provide that each
surety submits himself to the jurisdiction of
the court and irrevocably appoints the clerk
of the court as his agent upon whom any
papers affecting his liability on the undertaking may be served, and that his liability
may be enforced on motion and upon such
notice as the court may require without the
necessity of an independent action.
No other procedure for the approval of bondsmen is
specified by the Utah Legislature.

The Legislature has granted

circuit court judges, when acting as magistrates, broad
discretionary powers over sureties to written undertakings.

The

entire field of the regulation of bondsmen has not been preempted
by legislative action.

This Court has imposed no additional

standards.
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Furtherf curcuit courts have certain common law
inherent judicial powers in addition to those specifically
prescribed by the Legislature.

As a common law inherent judicial

power, courts have the authority to authorize and control
bondsmen in their jurisdiction.
334 SW2d 733.

Taylor v. Waddy, (Tenn., 1960)

The Supreme Court of Tennessee in Taylor v.

Waddey, in construing the Release from Custody and Bail Reform
Act, T.C.A., § 40-12-1 et. seq., held that statutes concerning
the regulation of bail bondsmen and their qualifications are
directory only and do not cover the whole field of what is
necessary for a bondsmen before he is allowed to make bonds in
various cases and that such statutes do not take away inherent
right of the court to peroperly administer its affairs. The
Court reasoned that a court with general judicial powers has
certain inherent judicial powers and rights to see that the
courts over which they preside, in the absence of any statute on
the subject, are conducted in an honest and upright manner by
those who are officers of the court or who are dealing with the
court.

334 S.W.2d 733, 736.
The releveant Tennessee statute is an extensive

statutory system for dealing with bail and bondsmen based on
public policy considerations aimed at controlling certain
questionable practices.

In Utah, the bonding statutes are

directory only and do not cover the entire field of regulation of
bondsmen, particularly in light of the limited control the
Legislature has exercised over the courts in this area.

The

statutes do not interfere with judge1s inherent powers such as
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the administration of court affairs, which includes the approval
and revocation of bonding authority.
The acceptance and approval of bonds is a judicial
function of the court.

Summit Fidelity & Surety Co. v. Nimitz.

158 Neb. 762, 64 N.W.2d 803 (1954)

Authority to authorize,

supervise, and control bondsmen lies with the magistrate having
jurisdiction over the person arrested.

Furthermore, there are no

Utah cases which grant that supervisory authority to anyone other
than the magistrate and no Utah cases have held that bondsmen are
granted a license to write bonds.
In the instant case, the bondsmen were granted the
privilege to issue ritten undertakings in the Ninth Circuit
Court.

Judge Owens has the authority and discretion, pursuant to

§§ 77-20-4, 77-20-5, and common law inherent judicial powers, to
authorize and control bondsmen.

That privilege to issue bonds

continues at the discretion of the court.

There is no authority

in Utah for the suggestion that the privilege, once granted by a
magistrate, continues indefinitely.

The bondsmen have in no way

been granted a life estate to write bonds in the Ninth Circuit
Court.

The discretion is with the magistrate, Judge Owens, as to

how long that privilege may continue and that discretion may be
exercised on a case by case basis. Sections 77-20-4 and 77-20-5.
Further, if the surety company should conduct his
business in a manner as to lose the confidence of the court or a
judge thereof, the court or judge by exercising the court1s
inherent powers could refuse to accept bonds of any named surety.
Concord Casualty & Surety Co. v. United States. 69 F.2d 78, 81
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(2nd Cir. 1934).

The court's judicial act of approval of a bond

is not mandatory under § 77-20-4, supra, but the statute calls
for the exercise of judicial discretion.
A general rule exists that when judicial discretion is
appropriate, considerable weight should be given to the
determination of the trial court.
700, 702 (Utah 1974).

Barber v. Calderf 522 P.2d

This is true because the trial judge is in

the best position to determine what the interests of justice
require in safeguarding the rights and interests of all parties
concerned due to his close involvement with the parties, the
witnesses, and the total circumstances of the case.

id.

In the context of regulating bail bondsmen in his
court, Judge Owens is in the best position to determine what
justice requires in safeguarding the interests of the accused,
the court, and the bondsmen.

Therefore, great deference should

be given each judge in regulating bondsmen at the circuit court
level.

£££ jaLSQr Gilbreath v. Ferguson/ where the Tennessee

Supreme Court stated, "Of course, the judge has full authority to
determine who shall and who shall not qualify as bondsmen in his
own court."

260 S.W.2d 276, 278 (Tenn. 1953).

Moreover, the bondsmen have no recognized property
right to act as bondsmen before the Ninth Circuit Court.

When

bondsmen's privilege to issue bonds was revoked because Judge
Owens no longer had confidence that the underwritings secured by
bondsmen would continue in execution of sentence as provided in
S 77-20-7 and the specific terms of the individual undertakings,
the bondsmen were deprived of no recognized property right in
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Utah,

Judge Owens properly exercised his discretionary, inherent

authority to authorize or not authorize a bondsman pursuant to
current law.

The privilege to act as bondsman in the Ninth

Circuit Court is conditioned upon the understanding that the term
of each bond would continue in execution of any sentence.
Section 77-20-7. As long as the bondsmen are willing to comply
with the terms of the agreement, the provisions of the statute,
and the specific language of the written undertakings, and are
qualified to act as bondsmen pursuant to law, there would have
been no action taken by Judge Owens to alter the privilege which
had been granted them to issue bonds in the Ninth Circuit Court.
In jurisdictions where a license has been granted by an
administrative body to act as bondsmen, revocation of that
license without notice and hearing would probably violate due
process of law.

However, in Utah, no license is granted to

bondsmen, bondsmen are not controlled in any way

by any

administrative agency or body, and the authority to accept
sureties on written undertakings is within the sole discretion of
a magistrate.

Sections 58-1-11 through -20. Therefore, the due

process argument is without merit.
In other jurisdictions courts have recognized a due
process right to notice and hearing prior to revocation of a bail
bondsmen's license. J3L££, i.e. In Re Carter. 192 F.2d 15 (D.C.

Cir. 1951); Weaver v. Dostertr 300 s.E.2d 102 (w.va. 1983).
However, the circumstances of these cases differ significantly
from the instant case.

Carter dealt with congressional

legislation which removed part of inherent authority of the D.C.
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district courts to regulate bondsmen in their jurisdiction.

The

legislation granted bondsmen in D.C. courts licenses, a property
right, for a limited term.

Weaver involved a statute, W.Va. Code

S 51-10-8 (1959), which was substantially similar to D.C. Code §
23-602 cited in Carter,

The Supreme Court of Appeals of West

Virginia found that authority to act as a bondsmen sufficiently
resembles a license and therefore must be treated as a license
for purposes of procedural requirement attendant upon its
termination.

300 S.E.2d at 103. Once finding that bondsmen are

granted a license, the Weaver court followed Carter without
discussion.

Moreover, Weaver has not been followed in any other

jurisdiction.
Significantly, there is no grant of a license and no
grant of a property right to bondsmen in Utah.

At most bondsmen

have a privilege to issue undertakings and the magistrate has the
discretion to accept bonds issued by bondsmen.

Bondsmen are not

authorized to issue bonds for any specific period of time. The
period of time a bondsmen may issue bonds may be on a case by
case approval of undertakings by a magistrate.

The Legislature

has not taken the Utah courts their common law authority to
regulate bondsmen in their jurisdiction.

Section 77-20-5 has

merely specified minimal qualifications requirements for
sureties.

The Legislature, in its wisdom has determined that

magistrates shall continue to have and to exercise broad
discretionary powers in this area.

It can be presumed that if

the Legislature intended that bondsmen be licensed, they would
have enacted appropriate licensing provisions.
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A strong dissent to the majority opinion in Carter was
written by Judge Prettymannf in which Judge's Stephens and
Proctor joined.

192 F.2d 15, 17-29.

The minority argued

pursuasively that the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals has no
jurisdiction to review orders of the U.S. District Court upon
original applications for authority to write bonds or upon
applications for renewal, except where there is an abuse of
discretion by the Court below.

The dissent argues that Congress

left to the trial courts the making of rules under statutef that
the authority to accept a bondsmen is within the discretion of
the trial courts, and that that authority must not be disturbed
unless there is found an abuse of that discretion.

192 F.2d 15f

17-29.
Judge Prettyman argues that the writing of bail bonds
is not a right and that the customary elements of due process of
law are not required for valid denial of the privilege and states
as follows:

The writing of bail bonds for pay is not
an ordinary vocation the right to pursue
which is a basic right and as to which the
police power of the state is sharply limited.
In the first placer the admission to bail is
part of the operation of the trial courts.
It is the placing of an accused in the
custody of persons selected by him who
become, so to speak, his friendly jailers.
It is the substitution of one custodian for
another. The surety upon the bail has power
to arrest the accused. The granting of bail
is governed by the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure. It is performed by a
commissioner, judge or justice. Thus going
bail is not an ordinary and independent
vocation but is an integral part of the
operation of the judicial system. In the

second placer the bail bond is a contract
with the Government,

According to the
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doctrine of Perkins Vt kukens Steel Co«, no
person has a "right" to do business with the
Government by contract. That doctrine is
peculiarly applicable to bail contracts,
because, from the very nature of the
transaction, the qualification of a surety to
appear upon even one bond is in large measure
within judicial discretion*
192 F.2d 15, 18-19.
[Emphasis added.]
Judge Prettyman concluded:
All the foregoing characteristics of
bail bonds combine to indicate that there is
no basic "right" to enter into thenu as
suretyr with the Government Due process of
law applies to a deprivation onlyt If a
person is not engaged in a business and has
no enforceable right to enter upon it. he is
not deprived of a right if he is denied the
privilege> Since there is no right to write
bail bonds for pay, my view is that the
customary elements of due process of law are
not required for valid denial of the
privilege*
192 F.2d 15, 19.
[Emphasis added.1
The Tennessee Supreme Court in Taylor Vt Waddey, supra,
analyzed the Carter decision and refused to go as far as the
Federal Circuit Court of Appeals.

The Taylor court adopted Judge

Prettyman1s argument from the dissent and determined that the
courts have inherent powers above and beyond the directions
provided in the bail statutes.

334 SW2d 733, 737. Taylor also

stated that so long as the bondsman complies with the statutes
and meets a fair and rasonable standard in the conduct of his
business before the courts then there is no one who is going to
prevent him from practicing his profession therein.

Under those

circumstances there is no violation of the due process of the law
because due process applies only to a deprivation.
737.

334 SW2d 733,

Therefore, the notice and hearing which it is insisted
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Judge Owens allegedly failed to provide for could in any event be
only such notice and hearing as would afford due process when it
is contemplated that some constitutional right is claimed to be
invaded.
In this case there is no deprivation of due process.
For there to have been a violation of due process, there must
have been a deprivation of a property right.

The bondsmen have

no property right to issue bonds in the Ninth Circuit Court.
Bondsmen have no license to act as bondsmen.

The term of the

underwritings to be issued by bonds in the Ninth Circuit Court
was provided for by law, by terms of the bond, and by agreement
and was a condition upon which the privilege to write bonds was
predicated.

Bondsmen, by their own actions clearly indicated

that they no longer intended to be bound by the terms of the
agreement, the terms of the bonding statute, and the specific
terms of the written undertakings, thereby rendering themselves
unsuitable to issue bonds in the Ninth Circuit Court.

The

bondsmen were afforded notice and hearing at the forfeiture
hearings for the bonds which were forfeited in the circuit court,
both before and after this action was commenced.

The issue as to

the term of undertakings should have been raised below and an
appeal taken therefrom.
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POINT V
THE DISTRICT COURT IMPROPERLY INTERPRETED
UTAH CODE ANN §§ 77-20-7 AND 77-20-8 WITH
RESPECT TO THE EFFECTIVE TERM OF THE
UNDERTAKING OF BAIL AND THE LIABILITY OF
BONDSMEN.
The term of the undertaking of bail and the liability
of bondsmen continue up to and including the surrender of the
defendant in execution of any sentence imposed.

The District

Court erroneously ruled that the undertakings of bail were
exonerated by operation of law upon the imposition of sentence by
the Ninth Circuit Court and that the bondsmen were accordingly
released from liability.

However, this ruling misinterprets the

language of § 77-20-7(1) (1980) which provides:
The principal and the sureties on the
written undertaking are liable thereon during
all proceedings and for all appearances
required of the defendant up to and including

the surrender of the defendant in execution
of any sentence imposed irrespective of any
contrary provision in the undertaking.
[Emphasis added].
Section 77-20-8 further provides in pertinent part:
Upon conviction, by plea or trial, the court
may order a defendant to be taken into

custody or may order bail continued pending
imposition of sentence«
[Emphasis added].
Standing alone, § 77-20-8 may be read to support the
District Court1s ruling.

However, when read in conjunction with

§ 77-20-7, the District Court improperly interpreted the intent
of the statutes.

Furthermore, it is necessary to consider that

the primary purpose of bail is to ensure the appearance of the
defendant at all proceedings required by the court, "up to and
including the surrender of the defendant in execution of any
-23-

sentence imposed,"
added).

Utah Code Ann. § 77-20-7 (1980) (emphasis

Also, the specific language of the bonds provides the

same term of the statute.
In Walton v. Circuit Courtr No. 16281 (December 12f
1979), this Court held that when defendants were ordered to pay a
fine, but no jail sentence was imposed, their bondsman was
released from liability.

Appendix A.

The Court reasoned that

the defendants were no longer subject to detention on the charges
and judgments against them and that the purpose for the bail
bonds had been fulfilled.

In the present caser a jail sentence

was imposed upon each defendant in addition to a fine and other
conditions of probation.

Therefore, the defendants remained

subject to detention on the charges and the purpose for the bail
bonds had not been fulfilled.

Consequently, the circuit court

properly refused to exonerate the bonds.
Significantly, the Legislature recognized the
difference between imposition of a sentence and execution of a
sentence.

Section 77-20-7(i) provides that sureties are liable

for a term up to and including the "execution of any sentence
imposed,"

[Emphasis added].

distinction.

Other courts have recognized this

Gibson v. State, 655 P.2d 1028 (Okla. 1982);

Kriebel v. United States, 10 F.2d 762 (7th Cir. 1926).

In

Gibson, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma refused to exonerate a bond
when the defendant failed to render himself in execution of
judgment after sentencing.

655 P.2d at 1030.

The court in

Kribel defined "imposition of sentence" as the laying on of
sentence or the act of sentencing and "execution" as the act or
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process of carrying out in accordance with a plan, purpose or
order.

10 F.2d at 764.
Moreoverf the general rule is that a bond entered into

voluntarily and for a lawful consideration is valid as a
contractual obligation if it is not contrary to public policy.

Bendrick v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 154 Kan. 79, 114
P.2d 812#(1941); Day v. Walton, 199 Tenn. 10, 281 S.W.2d 685
(1955) .
In the instant case, the bondsmen entered into an
agreement, not inconsistent with law, with Judge Owens to write
bonds in that court subject to the understanding that term of the
undertakings would continue through probation.

The language of

the statute is entirely consistent with such an agreement.
Therefore, because the bondsmen entered into this relationship
voluntarily and the agreement does not violate public policy they
are bound by their agreement.
For all of the above reasons, this Court should reverse
the district court's ruling releasing the bondsmen from liability
and find that bail bonds are exonerated at the completion of
probation.
CONCLUSION
For all of the above reasons, Appellants respectfully
request that the Court find that pursuant to Utah law, practice
and procedure, that Judge Owens has the authority and discretion
to supervise bondsmen in the Ninth Circuit Court and that he
acted properly therein.

Furthermore, that the bondsmen had an

appropriate remedy for direct appeal to the district court and
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failure to raise that appeal constituted a waiver.

Finally, that

the district court improperly and without authority issued an
extraordinary writ.

Therefore, the district court's ruling

should be reversed.
DATED this

/?

day of April, 1986.
DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General

DIANE W. WILKINS
Assistant Attorney General
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day of April, 1985.

APPENDIX

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
——00O00-—~

Vincent P. Walton, et al.,
Plaintiff6 and Respondents9

No. 16281
F I L E D
December 12, 1979

Circuit Court, State of Utah,
Salt Lake County, Salt Lake City
Department, and the Honorable
Maurice D. Jones9 Circuit Judge,
Defendants and Appellants.

Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk

PER CURIAM:
Defendants appeal from an adverse summary judgment
ordering the exoneration of the undertakings of the bail bonds
of four defendants in cases filed in the Salt Lake City Court,
sow the Circuit Court. Each of the four defendants had been
charged in the Salt Lake City Court with a misdemeanor and had
been admitted to bail on undertakings complying with the requirements of Section 77-43-13, U.C.A. 1953, furnished by the
plaintiff. In the course of the proceedings, each defendant
had been convicted or had entered a guilty plea, and had
personally appeared in court and been sentenced to pay a fine
of $150.00. Some records pertaining to the cases have been
lost. However, the documents available Indicate that the
sentence was to pay a fine and they do not show that any jail
sentence had been imposed as a part of any sentence, nor to
enforce payment of any fine. The court gave each defendant
30 days to pay the fine, which period expired without payment.
Proceedings were instituted against the bondsman on the theory
that the undertaking in the bail bonds required the bondsman
to pay any fine Imposed if the defendants failed to pay as
ordered. All four bonds were ordered to be forfeited. The
bondsman sought relief in the District Court, and obtained a
Judgment ordering, among other things, that the Circuit Court
exonerate the undertakings in bail and release the bondsman
from liability.
The liability of the bondsman is determined by the
terms of the suretyship undertaking. There is no express
requirement in the language of the undertaking that Imposes
liability on the bondsman for payment of any fine. There is
a statement "that the defendant will render himself In execution of the Judgment.*1 This statement presupposes that the
Judgment is one that provides for Imprisonment or for imprisonment to enforce payment of a fine. A Judgment limited to a
fine constitutes a lien, upon which an execution may be Issued
as on a Judgment in a civil action.

In the words of Justice Cordoza: "In the discretion
of the court the judgment may direct that the defendant shall
be~Imprisoned until the fine is paid. If the direction for
Imprisonment is omitted, the remedy by execution is exclusive.
Imprisonment does not follow automatically upon a showing of
default in payment. It follows, if at all, because the consequence has been prescribed in the imposition of jtfee sentence.
The choice of pains and penalties, when choice is committed
to the discretion of the court, is part of the judicial function. This being so, it must have expression in the sentence,
and the sentence is the judgment.91 Rill v. United States,
298 U.S. 460, 80 L. Ed. 1283, 56 8. Ct. 760.
When fines only were imposed against the four defendants, they could no longer be subjected to any detention
on the charges and judgments against then. The purpose for the
bail bonds had been fulfilled, and their bondsman was released
from any further liability.
The judgment of the District Court is affirmed.
costs awarded.
Wilkins, Justice, does not participate herein.
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